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program may affect the feasibility of actual projects.  
 
Keywords: Climate Policy, Greenhouse Effect, Carbon Sequestration, Agroforestry, Transaction Costs 
 
Introduction 
Since the Kyoto protocol entered into force in February 2005 the international carbon 
market has grown considerably. In 2006 carbon transactions amounted to 1.6 billion 
tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) with a value exceeding $30 billion. This study was 
motivated by the possibility that markets for greenhouse gas emissions may benefit 
farmers, by compensating them for adopting farm forestry systems that capture more 
CO2 from the atmosphere than traditional cropping systems. Tree-based systems are a 
convenient way of reducing net carbon emissions by sequestering CO2 from the 
atmosphere through the process of photosynthesis. The CO2 absorbed by trees 
remains fixed in wood and other organic matter in forests for long time periods.  
The global warming problem creates a demand for carbon credits, and high oil prices 
and uncertain supply have increased the demand for biofuels. Farmers are in a 
position to supply both carbon credits and biofuels. Farmers would normally not be 
able participate directly in the international carbon market, but they could participate 
in projects that function as intermediaries.  
Landholders who supply carbon credits will incur different abatement costs (the costs 
per unit of uncertified emission reductions) and transaction costs (the costs of 
converting those emission reductions into a tradeable commodity). Abatement costs 
can be estimated as the opportunity cost of undertaking a carbon-sequestration 
activity rather than the most profitable alternative activity, or the cost of switching 
from the previous land use (baseline) to the proposed land use. In order to participate 
in the carbon market, it is not enough for projects to cover their abatement costs; they 
also have to incur transaction costs to certify the abatement services they provide. 
Both abatement and transaction costs must be considered in order to evaluate the 
feasibility of farmers participation in carbon markets. 
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This paper starts with a brief overview of the international carbon market. Followed 
by the development of a model of project participation. The model considers the 
necessary conditions for a buyer (project developer) and a group of sellers (farmers) 
to engage in a carbon-sequestration contract. Based on this model, a project feasibility 
frontier (PFF) is derived that defines the minimum feasible project size for any given 
carbon price. The model is later extended to incorporate bioenergy production in 
addition to carbon sequestration. This involves the application of a rental price on 
carbon stocks during tree growth and a purchase price on carbon flows when trees are 
used as sources of energy. Results indicate that combining sequestration and 
bioenergy can considerably enhance the feasibility of projects involving farmer 
contracts. Throughout the paper currency is measured in US Dollars unless otherwise 
specified. 
Overview of the carbon market 
This section presents a brief overview of the carbon market largely based on reports 
produced by the World Bank (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006, 2007; Lecocq, 2004; 
Lecocq and Capoor, 2003, 2005) and supplemented by price data from other sources.  
The international carbon market has been likened to a currency market, rather than a 
commodity market, because there are several fragmented markets that coexist, with 
different degrees of interconnection (Capoor and Ambrosi 2006, 2007).  
Carbon transactions are classified into two types: allowance based and project based 
(Capoor and Ambrosi 2006). Allowance-based transactions are based on a cap-and-
trade mechanism, where emission allowances are allocated by regulators, and emitters 
trade these allowances based on their marginal abatement costs. Project-based 
transactions consist of a buyer who purchases emission credits from a project that has 
been independently certified. Project-based transactions can occur even in the absence 
of a regulatory regime; as long as two parties agree on the transaction (Lecocq 2004). 
In both types of markets, emission credits are measured in tonnes of CO2 equivalents 
(CO2e). This unit of exchange allows trade of other greenhouse gases based on their 
global warming potential.  Table 1 presents a summary of recent activity in carbon 
markets. The number of transactions more than doubled between 2005 and 2006. In 
2006 the aggregated value of the international carbon market exceeded $30 billion, 
representing 1.6 billion tCO2e. 
[Table 1 Here] 
Allowance-Based Transactions 
The largest allowance market by far is the European Union Emission Trading Scheme 
(EU-ETS), which trades in European Union Allowances (EUA). Of the $30 billion 
worth of transactions in 2006, $24 billion were EUAs with a volume of 1.1 billion 
tCO2e. EUA prices have exhibited high volatility (Figure 1). Spot prices for Phase I 
transactions (which expired in December 2007) reached a peak of €30/tCO2e in April 
2006, followed by a fast collapse when large amounts of verified emission data were 
released and the market realised that too many allowances had been allocated. In the 
second half of 2007 the Phase II price (labelled Dec 08 in Figure 1) became the 
reference price. The discrepancy between Phase I and Phase II prices was caused by 
the inability to bank (carry forward) unused allowances from Phase I, which made 
these allowances worthless beyond the compliance year of 2007. The design of Phase   3
II allows banking, which should bring continuity to the market and encourage 
investors to undertake more long-term investments (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2007).  
[Figure 1 Here] 
The New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (NSW GGAS) is small by 
world standards but represents an important development within Australia and it was 
one of the first carbon markets in the world. This is an allowance market (established 
in January 2003) that imposes mandatory emission benchmarks on all NSW 
electricity retailers and other parties. Participants are required to reduce their 
emissions to the level of the benchmark. Excess emissions can be offset by 
surrendering abatement certificates which can be traded (Lecocq 2004). These 
abatement certificates are created through project-based activities which may include 
capture of carbon through forestry, reductions in electricity demand by consumers and 
other options. Excess emissions that have not been offset at the end the compliance 
year attract a penalty. The current value of the penalty is A$12. A total of 20 million 
certificates were traded in the NSW market in 2006, with an estimated value of $225 
million (Table 1). Between 2005 and early 2007, average weekly prices in the NSW 
market fluctuated between A$10.70 and A$14.75 (Figure 2); consistently above the 
penalty for non-compliance (Figure 3). Explanations for this seemingly irrational 
behaviour have included corporate image (firms do not want to be perceived as 
‘dirty’) and expectations that fines will increase in the future (Capoor and Ambrosi 
2006). Recently, prices have collapsed to just above AU$5.10. Some analysts attribute 
this collapse to uncertainty regarding the attributes of the carbon market planned by 
the federal government. 
[Figure 2 Here] 
Other allowance markets include the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) and the UK 
emissions trading scheme. The former deals with voluntary emission reductions and 
reported $38 million worth of transactions in 2006 (Table 1); the latter was the first 
country-wide emission-trading scheme (launched in March 2002), but it has reported 
only a small amount of transactions (not shown in Table 1). 
Project-Based Transactions  
The largest representative of project-based markets is the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, which trades on Certified Emission 
Reductions (CER). Within the CDM, 450 million tonnes of CO2e were traded in 2006, 
with a value of $4.8 billion (Table 1). The secondary CDM represents financial 
institutions and funds that have engaged in secondary transactions of carbon 
portfolios with other banks or companies facing compliance obligations, these 
transactions amounted to a value of $444 million in 2006 (Table 1).  
The Joint Implementation (JI) Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol deals in Emission 
Reduction Units (ERU). This market traded a total of 16 million tCO2e in (2006) with 
a value of $141 million (Table 1). Most of these transactions came from projects in 
Russia, Eastern Europe and New Zealand. Other project-based transactions, which 
include the voluntary market, amounted to a value $79 in 2006 (Table 1). 
A disadvantage of project-based transactions is the time lag between signing of a 
contract and the time when emission credits are delivered. This, coupled with the fact 
that project performance is uncertain, means that CERs have certain risks not present   4
in allowance markets (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006), and CER buyers in general have 
offered lower prices to compensate for these risks. Another factor that may lead to 
lower prices is that project-based exchanges tend to exhibit higher transaction costs 
than allowance exchanges. However Lecocq and Capoor (2003, p.20) state that prices 
for emission reductions from “small projects with a strong sustainable development 
contribution command premiums in the marketplace”, they also point out that 
“Retailers report a marked preference by customers for community-based agro-
forestry and other forestry deals.” 
Average CER prices in 2005 were approximately $7.20 (range $2.60 to $14.90), 
increasing to $10.95 (range $6.70 to $24.80) in 2006 (Figure 3). The secondary 
market exhibited higher average prices, but with a decrease between 2005 and 2006 
(from $22.20 to $17.70). The prices of ERUs under Joint Implementation were the 
lowest, with averages of $6.00 and $8.60 in 2005 and 2006 respectively. 
[Figure 3 Here] 
As of January 2008, a total of 901 projects had been registered with the CDM 
Executive Board, with an expected delivery of 1.15 billion CERs until the end of 
2012. Of these, 53% are large-scale projects and 43% are small-scale
2. In terms of 
regions, Asia dominates with 80% of emission reductions, followed by Latin America 
with 10% (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2007). 
The land-use change and forestry (LUCF) sector accounted for only 1% by volume. 
LUCF assets face two disadvantages: they require complex methodologies, and the 
EU-ETS denies market access to LUCF projects
3 (Capoor and Ambrosi 2006). Thus, 
the current lack of LUCF projects has been caused by methodological complications 
rather than by any obvious lack of competitiveness of biological mitigation relative to 
energy efficiency.  
A model of project participation 
This paper focuses on project-based transactions. The model of project participation 
of Cacho and Lipper (2006) provides the basis of this analysis. The original model 
was modified and extended to account for both temporary CERs associated with 
carbon accumulation during tree growth and permanent CERs associated with 
renewable energy production. 
Consider a project composed of one buyer and many sellers. The buyer is a project 
developer and the sellers are farmers. The sellers are paid for adopting forestry land 
uses that sequester carbon above a baseline. The buyer purchases these carbon offsets 
and sells them in the CER market. So the buyer acts as an intermediary between the 
landholders and the international carbon market. 
Let sellers be identified by an index j = 1,2,…n. A seller j will participate in the 
project if the reward received for carbon sequestration (vCj) is larger than the 
opportunity cost of switching land uses (the abatement cost, vAj)  plus the transaction 
cost of participating in the project (vTj), The condition for seller participation is: 
                                                 
2 Data from CDM web site at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html 
3 A linking directive approved by the European Parliament in 2004, allows participants in the EU-ETS 
market to use emission-reduction credits from the CDM, but this does not include projects in the LUCF 
sectors.   5
Tj Aj Cj v v v + >  (1) 
 with the three variables measured in terms of present value. The buyer will 
implement a project if the present value of carbon payments received in the CER 
market (VC) is at least equal to the present value of payments to smallholders (the 
abatement cost to the buyer, VA) plus the transaction costs of designing and 
implementing the project (VT). The condition for buyer participation is: 
T A C V V V + ≥  (2) 
Carbon Payments and Abatement Costs  
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where aj is the area of land converted to forestry in year zero; (Cjt – C0t) represents the 
stock of carbon above the baseline per hectare of land in year t; pF is the farm price of 
carbon and δS is the seller’s discount rate. 
For the buyer, carbon payments are given by the discounted sum of payments 
obtained by accumulating the carbon offsets produced by all landholders in the 
project, certifying them and selling them in the CER market: 
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where pC is the rental price per tonne of carbon and δB is the buyer’s discount rate.  
Abatement costs are the costs of producing one unit of uncertified carbon 
sequestration services. For sellers abatement costs are measured as the opportunity 
cost of not undertaking the most profitable land-use activity as a result of adopting a 
prescribed activity that stores additional carbon. This opportunity cost is the present 
value of the stream of net revenues foregone as a result of participating in the project. 
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where r0t and rjt represent the net revenues per hectare in year t for the baseline and 
the proposed land use respectively. 
The abatement cost to the buyer is the present value of the stream of payments to 
landholders for carbon-sequestration services: 
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 In order to implement these equations we require information on carbon sequestration 
rates and net revenue streams for the baseline and the forestry activity.  
Carbon trajectories for the baseline and the project activity, C0(t) and Cj(t) used below 
do not consider soil carbon, which is more expensive to measure than biomass carbon.   6
For projects that are known to have non-decreasing effects on soil carbon it may not 
be necessary to measure this pool after the baseline is established. As a general rule, 
reforestation projects in agricultural lands tend to increase soil carbon and, if the 
marginal cost of measuring this carbon pool is greater than the marginal benefit of the 
carbon credits obtained, the project developer would prefer not to measure this pool 
(see Cacho et al 2004).   
Net revenue streams for the baseline and the project activity, r0t and rjt, are calculated 
based on inputs (labour, fertiliser and seedlings etc.) and outputs (fruit, timber, resin 
etc.) for the region of interest. In this case we selected a fast-growing tree used for 
pulp and timber (Acacia mangium) which is popular in Indonesia and represents one 
of the main plantation trees in Sumatra. 
The expected amount of carbon sequestered in aboveground biomass was estimated 
















=  (7) 
The parameter values (β1, β2, β3 ) were set to (282.3, 1.216, 0.517). The mean carbon 
stock of this system (130 tC/ha) is of similar magnitude to the systems used in the 
Scolel Te smallholder project in Mexico (128 ± 25.6 tC/ha) reported by de Jong et al. 
(2004).  
The baseline is assumed to be an annual cassava crop (NPV = $2,705/ha) and the 
project activity is an A. mangium plantation harvested every 8 years (NPV = 
$2,367/ha). Based on equation (5), the seller abatement cost for this project, under the 
assumption of identical sellers, is therefore: vA= a (2,705 – 2,367) = a 338. The 
discount rates were set at δB = 0.06 and δS = 0.15 to reflect the high cost of credit 
faced by smallholders in Indonesia. 
Transaction Costs 
Cacho, Marshall and Milne (2003, 2005) present a typology of transaction costs 
applicable to carbon-sink projects. In this study we aggregate their seven categories 
into five and distinguish between the costs borne by buyers and sellers.  
Transaction cost assumptions are presented in Table 2. These values are based on 
estimates from the literature (see Cacho and Lipper, 2006 for details). The original 
five transaction-cost categories are disaggregated to account for variation in the units 
of measurement. The expanded classification is presented in the ‘sub-type’ column 
(Table 2), where number subscripts denote the different cost types. For example, there 
are three types of monitoring costs; WM1 ($/ha/y), WM2 ($/y), and WM3 (CER/y).  
Transaction costs for sellers were calculated based on the time required for different 
activities multiplied by the wage rate.  
[Table 2 here] 
Search and negotiation costs for the buyer include consultation and negotiation 
sessions with farmers, establishment of the baseline and estimation of carbon flows of 
the project, design of a monitoring plan, establishment of permanent sampling plots 
and preparation of a Project Design Document (PDD) for submission to the CDM 
Executive Board (WS1); they also include the design of individual farm plans and   7
contracts (WS2). For sellers these costs include attendance to information sessions, 
undertaking training and participating in the design of farm plans and contracts (wS) 
Approval costs for the buyer include approval of the project by the host government, 
validation of the project proposal by a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) and a 
registration fee upon submission of the PDD to the CDM Executive Board (WA). The 
approval cost for sellers consists of obtaining local government permission to 
participate in the project (wA). 
Project management costs for the buyer include purchase of IT infrastructure and 
establishment of a local office (WP1); as well as maintaining databases and software, 
administering payments to farmers, coordinating field crews and paying salaries 
(WP2). For sellers these represent the annual costs of attending project meetings (wP).  
Monitoring costs for the buyer include randomly checking carbon stocks reported by 
farmers (WM1); verification and certification of carbon stocks by a DOE (WM2); and an 
adaptation fee payable to the CDM Executive Board to help poor countries adapt to 
climate change (WM3). For sellers they consist on measuring trees, filling in report 
forms and delivering them to the project office (wM). 
Enforcement and insurance costs for the buyer include an allowance per farm for 
settlement of disputes (WE1); and the cost of maintaining a buffer of carbon stocks that 
are not sold (WE2) to cover for the eventuality that the project will under-perform.  For 
sellers they include an allowance for the costs of protecting their plots from fire and 
the cost of participating in dispute resolution (wE). 
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Carbon Prices 
The farm price of carbon (pF) must be set at a level that satisfies conditions (1) and 
(2). The feasible range of farm prices is influenced by the market price of carbon (pC). 
Here we express both these variables as annual rental prices per unit of biomass 
carbon stored in trees. This avoids the need of dealing with the permanence problem 
(see Cacho et al 2003) by imposing arbitrary carbon accounting procedures or 
constraining the duration of temporary CERs
4. To estimate rental prices consider the 
present value (PV) of an asset that yields a perpetual stream of annual payments Y 
discounted at rate i: 
                                                 
4 A temporary CER or ‘tCER is a CER issued for an AR project activity which expires at the end of the 
commitment period following the one during which it was issued (UNFCCC document 







In a perfect market the ratio Y/PV is equivalent to the rental price of the asset 
expressed as a proportion of the asset’s value. If we let the asset be a CER (expressed 
as a tonne of CO2e) valued at price pCER, and consider that the process of 
photosynthesis converts 3.67 units of CO2 into one unit of biomass carbon, then the 
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Clearly, the CER price places an upper limit on the feasible farm price, because the 
buyer would set pF ≤ pC even in the absence of transaction costs. 
Analysis of Project Feasibility 
In the analysis presented here we assume that the project developer establishes 
individual contracts whereby farmers agree to change their land use from cropping to 
forestry and receive payments for the carbon captured in their trees. For simplicity the 
project is assumed to consist of n identical farms each consisting of a hectares. In 
designing the project the buyer decides on the number of participants (n), the carbon 
price paid to farmers (pF) and other features such as monitoring and risk-mitigation 
strategies.  
Based on conditions for project participation (1) and (2) and dropping the j subscripts 
for simplicity, the project is feasible if the following two conditions are satisfied: 
() () ( ) () ( ) S T S A S F C w v t r a v t C p a v δ δ δ , , , , , , ≥ −  (12) 
() ()( ) () ( ) ( ) B C T B F A B C C W t C p n a V t C p a V t C p a V δ δ δ , , , , , , , , , , , ≥ −  (13) 
Where C(t) is the eligible carbon trajectory (Cjt − C0t), r(t) is the trajectory of 
opportunity costs (r0t − rjt), and w and W are vectors of transaction costs for seller and 
buyer respectively (based on Table 2). The expressions on the left of the inequalities 
are the carbon margins (carbon payments minus abatement costs) and the expressions 
on the right are the transaction costs. Now we can solve the model for any set of 
values of the arguments in the functions above and determine when both conditions 
(12) and (13) are satisfied. 
The first step in the analysis is to determine bounds for the farm price for any set of 
values of other arguments in (12) and (13). This involves finding the minimum price 
acceptable to the average seller (pS) and the maximum price the buyer is willing to 
pay (pB). Let pS be the value of  pF which makes vC −vA=vT, and let pB be the value of 
pF which makes VC −VA=VT. The project is feasible only if pB ≥ pS, and the farm price 
falls within the range pS ≤ pF ≤ pB. The actual value of pF depends on the market 
power of the participants and the outcome of negotiations between buyer and sellers.  
Minimum feasible project size 
Now consider the effect of project size (or the number of farmer contracts) on the 
seller price (pS) and the buyer price (pB). Given our assumptions that each farmer 
engages in an individual contract with the buyer and that all farms are represented by 
the “average” farm, this analysis involves solving for pS and pB for any given value of   9
n (Figure 4). The buyer’s price increases at a decreasing rate as the number of farms 
under contract increases; whereas the seller’s price remains constant, because 
individual farm costs are independent of the number of farms under contract.  
 [Figure 4 here] 
In Figure 4, the minimum number of contracts (farms) is that at which pB = pS. For the 
base parameter values, any project size larger than 242 farms will yield a surplus (pB 
− pS).   
Project Feasibility Frontier 
The breakeven point at which pB = pS will shift as the values of the arguments in 
equations (12) and (13) change. It is of particular interest to determine how the 
position of this point is affected by the market price of CERs (pCER). This is illustrated 
in Figure 5. The curve in Figure 5 forms a frontier, because projects falling below or 
to the left of this curve are not feasible under the given transaction and abatement 
costs, whereas projects that fall above or to the right of the frontier are feasible. We 
call this curve the project feasibility frontier (PFF). 
[Figure 5 here] 
In essence, the PFF is the set of points at which the carbon margins just cover the 
transaction costs for both parties. The breakeven value of n for any given pCER can 
then converted to CER units based on the carbon-sequestration rate per unit area, thus 
allowing comparison with projects in the energy sector (see below). The PFF is a 
convenient way of exploring the influence of land productivity, individual transaction 
costs, or any other exogenous variable on the viability of a project. A new PFF can be 
derived by changing any exogenous variable and repeating the process; thus providing 
a useful tool for sensitivity analysis. 
Introducing Biomass Energy (Fuel Switching) 
Now assume that the biomass harvested every eight years is used to produce biofuel, 
so it is possible to claim CERs on the reduced emissions caused by replacing a fossil 
fuel, such as diesel or coal, with biomass fuel. The biomass fuel emissions receive 
carbon credits because they represent CO2 recently absorbed from the atmosphere, 
rather than CO2 absorbed millions of years ago as is the case with fossil fuels. 
Therefore biomass fuel emissions are said to be greenhouse neutral. The number of 
CERs that can be claimed by the project depend on the fuel that is being replaced. The 
following assumptions are made: 
•  Wood biomass contains 50% carbon; 
•  only 70% of biomass is usable as a fuel; 
•  the net calorific values (NCV) of wood, diesel and coal are as shown in Table 
3; 
•  the carbon content factors (CCF) of diesel and coal are as shown in Table 3. 
[Table 3 here] 
To estimate the number of CERs that can be claimed by the project for fuel 
substitution we need to obtain a wood-replacement factor for the fossil fuel in   10
question. These factors (t of CO2 fossil-fuel emissions avoided per t of carbon 
harvested from trees) are γ1 = 1.425 for diesel and γ2 = 1.829 for coal. The required 
calculations are shown in Table 3. The present value of the fuel-substitution activity 
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where Hτ is the amount of carbon harvested in year τ, tH is the set of harvest years and 
the subscript k represents either diesel (1) or coal (2). The value of Vk is then added to 
the present value of rental carbon (VC) to obtain the total value of carbon when a 
biofuel component is included in the project. The critical project-design variables can 
then be calculated following the same process as before. 
The introduction of biofuel in the project complicates the measurement of CERs 
because now there are two components: (1) annual rental payments on carbon stocks 
above the land-use baseline and (2) purchase payments on the flows of CO2 emissions 
replaced every harvest year relative to a baseline given by the fossil fuel being 
replaced (diesel or coal). Thus it is now more appropriate to report the project size in 
terms of carbon flows rather than number of farms. Average CER flows per unit area 
(t CO2/ha/y) are calculated for every eight-year rotation as consisting of 118 t 
CO2/ha/y during tree growth plus either 46.1 t CO2/ha/y or 59.2 t CO2/ha/y for diesel 
or coal, based on the replacement factors γk. CER flows per unit area are then 
multiplied by the project area to calculate the (CER) size of the project in terms of t 
CO2/y. For reference, the production of 200,000 CERs, requires 1,129 farmer 
contracts under the base assumptions. 
The effect of CER price (pCER) on minimum project size flattens out at pCER values 
beyond about $10 or $20/tCO2e depending on whether the project includes a biofuel 
component (Figure 6). There is a considerable gap between the base case and the 
biofuel cases, but the actual gap may not be as large if the costs of establishing a 
biofuel plant have to be covered by the project.  
 [Figure 6 here] 
Concluding Comments 
In this study we have assumed that farms participating in a project are homogeneous 
and are willing to supply carbon offsets at a fixed price, as long as abatement and 
transaction costs are covered. Essentially this assumption implies that the supply of 
carbon-sequestration services is perfectly elastic. This simplifies the analysis by 
allowing us to calculate transaction costs, abatements costs and carbon payments for 
the average farm, and then multiply the results by the number of farms to obtain 
project-level results. This simplification also makes it computationally feasible to 
derive the project-feasibility frontier (PFF) for a large number of scenarios, thus 
helping us understand the influence of different types of transaction costs and other 
assumptions on the feasibility of a project. In deriving the PFF we implicitly assume 
that there are as many farms available as needed by the project to cover transaction 
costs. In reality, a limited number of farms is available in a region and there can be 
considerable variability between farms in terms of size and productive capacity. Antle 
and Valdivia (2006) observed this variability in US agriculture and pointed out that it 
may have important implications for policy analysis of payments for environmental   11
services. Their minimum-data approach to the derivation of supply functions offers 
interesting possibilities for extension of the present study. 
The analysis of bioenergy presented above implicitly assumes either that there is an 
existing plant in the region which can take the harvested wood and produce a fuel 
such as biodiesel or ethanol, or that local power demand can switch from fossil fuel to 
woodfuel at no cost. This replacement, however, may require an investment in new 
equipment and this investment would become part of the buyer’s abatement cost. 
Different types of investments could be evaluated, one option would be the 
replacement of a diesel or coal generator with a wood-fired generator, another option 
would be the construction of lignocellulosic ethanol plant that can convert wood into 
liquid fuel. It is also possible that the introduction of a biofuel component into the 
project will change transaction costs by, for example, reducing monitoring and 
enforcement costs because farmers have to supply their harvest to the biofuel plant, 
thus providing a cheap audit on carbon outputs. These are interesting topics for future 
research. 
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   2005  2006  2005 2006 
Allowance markets 
  EU-ETS            321        1,101         7,908        24,357  
  NSW GGAS               6            20              59            225  
  CCX               1            10                3              38  
 
Project-based markets       
  Primary CDM            341          450         2,417         4,813  
  Secondary CDM             10            25            221            444  
  JI             11            16              68            141  
  Other             20            17            187              79  
        
Total              710        1,639        10,863        30,097  
   13
Table 2. Transaction cost assumptions for base case. 
Cost type  sub-type  Cost  Units 
 
Buyer (project manager) 
      
  Search and Negotiation  WS1  84,500 $ 
  WS2  500 $/farm 
 
  Approval  WA  7,000* $ 
 
  Project Management  WP1  20,000 $ 
  WP2  70,000 $/y 
 
  Monitoring  WM1 
 
8 $/ha/y 
  WM2  15,000 $/y 
  WM3  0.02 CERs/y 
 
  Enforcement and Insurance   WE1 
 
0.1 CERs/y 
  WE2  100 $/farm/y 
 
Sellers (farmers) 
      
  Search and Negotiation  wS  34.40 $ 
 
  Approval  wA  6.88 $ 
 
  Project Management  wP  8.60 $/y 
 
  Monitoring  wM  5.16 $/ha/y 
 
  Enforcement and Insurance  wE  20.64 $/y 
 
* Plus a registration fee that varies with project size <15,000 CERs=$5,000; 15,000 to 
<50,000 CERs=$10,000; 50,000 to <100,000 CERs=$15,000; 100,000 to < 
200,000=$20,000; >200,000 CERs = $30,000  
   14
Table 3. Energy and carbon content of alternative fuels. 
   Fuel   
 Variable  Wood  Diesel  Coal  Units 
  NCV - Net calorific value   13.8
a 43
b 28.2
 b  MJ / kg fuel 
  CCF - Carbon content factor 
b   0.0201  0.0258  kg  C  /  MJ 
Calculations      
a  Carbon produced by burning fuel  
    =  NCV × CCF  
0.864  0.728  kg C / kg fuel 
b  Wood required to replace fuel  
    = NCV wood  / NCV fuel  
3.116  2.043  kg wood /  kg fuel 
c  Equivalent carbon produced by wood  
    = a/b 
0.277  0.356  kg C / kg wood 
d CO2 replaced by wood  
    = 3.67 × c  
1.018 1.307  kg  CO2 / kg wood 
e  CO2 emissions replaced by biomass carbon (γk)
c  
    = 0.7 × d / 0.5 
1.425 1.829  kg  CO2 / 
kg biomass C 
Sources: 
a FAO 2004; 
b Kazunari (2005) coal values are for coking coal; 




























JFM AMJJA SON D JFM AMJJA SON DJFM AM JJA S ON D JFM AM JJA S ON DJFM AM JJA S ON D JFM AMJJA SON D
 
Figure 1. Prices of European Emission Allowances (2005-2007); spot prices are for Phase I 
allowances (which expired in December 2007); December 2008 prices represent phase II 
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Figure 2. Average weekly prices of NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Certificates (2005-2007); 
the dotted line represents the penalty for excess emissions not covered by certificates. Source: 









CER ERU Secondary CER



















Figure 3. Average prices and ranges of project-based carbon transactions for 2005 and 2006. 
























































Figure 4. The breakeven number of farms, indicated by the dotted line, is calculated as the point 
at which the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay (pB) equals the minimum price the seller 

















































































Figure 6. The project feasibility frontier for the base project and two alternative bioenergy 
projects replacing either diesel or coal. The dotted line indicates the approximate CER price 
($10) in 2006. 
 
 